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OSTRICH WITH ITS HEAD IN THE SAND: THE LAW,
INVENTORSHIP, & ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Ben Kovach*
ABSTRACT— As artificial intelligence (AI) system’s capabilities
advance, the law has struggled to keep pace. Nowhere is this more evident
than patent law’s refusal to recognize AI as an inventor. This is precisely
what happened when, in 2020, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) ruled that it will not accept an AI system as a named inventor on
a patent.
This note explores untenable legal fiction that the USPTO’s ruling
has created. First, it explores the current state of AI systems, focusing on
those capable of invention. Next, it examines patent law’s inventorship
doctrine and the USPTO’s application of that doctrine to AI inventors. The
note then explains that disallowing AI systems as inventors does not map
well onto patent law’s most common justifications. Finally, the note
recommends a solution that maximizes patent law’s incentive structure; AI
systems should be allowed as named inventors when patent ownership has
been pre-contracted away to a natural person. If patent ownership has not
been pre-contracted, the idea should enter the public domain and be
unpatentable.
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INTRODUCTION
The law has an artificial intelligence problem. The legal system’s
continued refusal to acknowledge artificial intelligence’s (AI) everadvancing ability has led to incoherent legal results. In 2018, a self-driving
car powered by an AI system in development by Uber hit and killed a
pedestrian.1 After concluding its investigation, the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) determined that Uber’s AI system did not correctly
identify and predict the path of the pedestrian, leading to the vehicle striking
and killing her.2 Despite the NTSB’s conclusion, Uber did not face any
criminal liability for the death.3 Only the human occupant in the vehicle at
the time, who was there for monitoring purposes, was charged with negligent
homicide.4 It is unknown whether or not Uber would have been held civilly
liable because the company preemptively settled with the decedent’s family
within two weeks of the crash.5
What can be gleaned from this lack of criminal liability for an AI system
onto IP law? As illustrated by the Uber AI tragedy, AI’s decision-making
capability and general sentience is being ignored by the law, leading to
incoherent and unjust outcomes. The driver of the car, an AI system, was not
charged when the car struck and killed a pedestrian.6 The creator, developer,
and owner of that driving system was also left legally untouched.7 The law
has opted to stick its head in the sand rather than address AI’s increasing
autonomous ability.
Nowhere is this lack of acknowledgement of AI’s capabilities more
evident than in patent law’s grappling with AI systems and inventorship. AI
systems are capable of conceiving patentable inventions right now.8 And yet,
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), based on readings
of the current statutory law, case law, and regulatory law, will not allow AI
to be listed as a named inventor on a patent.9

1
Matt McFarland, Uber Self-Driving Car Operator Charged in Pedestrian Death, CNN BUSINESS
(Sept. 18, 2020, 11:09 AM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/18/cars/uber-vasquez-charged/index.html
[https://perma.cc/PS3Q-VSA3].
2
Id.
3
See id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law,
57 B.C.L. REV. 1079, 1085 (“Dr. Thaler is listed as the patent’s inventor, but he states that the Creativity
Machine invented the patent’s subject matter. . . .”).
9
In re Application No. 16/524,350, 2019 Dec. Comm’r Pat. at 6 (“U.S. patent law does not permit a
machine to be named as the inventor in a patent application.”).
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The first part of this paper analyzes AI as it exists now and how the
current patent law regime is dealing with AI. It begins by describing the very
basics of artificial intelligence. Creativity machines, a unique class of AI
capable of generating patentable ideas, are described in more detail along
with specific examples of the patentable ideas that they have generated.10
Then, the paper explains inventorship, the most difficult patent law hurdle
for an AI system to clear.11 It shows, through reference to specific examples
of AI-conceived ideas, that creativity machines can meet the requirements of
inventorship.12 Finally, the USPTO’s decision to disallow AI as an inventor
is analyzed.13 It shows that the decision, while a correct reading of the current
law, also created an untenable legal fiction.
The second part of this paper considers how patent law should handle
AI as an inventor. It begins by analyzing the major theories of justification
for patent law, namely utility theory and labor theory.14 Next, it analyzes the
obvious candidates for AI inventorship if AI is not allowed to be an inventor:
the AI user, the AI creator, or nobody. It shows that all three of those options
have significant issues and that adhering to the legal fiction that AI cannot
be an inventor is problematic.
Rather than follow the USPTO’s legal fiction, this paper recommends
that the law properly recognize AI’s capability to invent and allow AI as a
named inventor when patent ownership has been pre-contracted away to a
natural person. This follows the thinking of Professor Ryan Abbott, author
of The Reasonable Robot: Artificial Intelligence and the Law and a leader in
artificial intelligence legal scholarship,15 who has argued that AI should be
allowed as an inventor and is also in favor of automatic patent assignment to
the AI owner.16 Abbott, however, does not consider what to do if an AI
system does not have an owner, a likely possibility with the growing
availability of open-source AI systems.17 This paper recommends that open-

10
IEI’s Patented Creativity Machine Paradigm, IMAGINATION ENGINES INC., http://imaginationengines.com/iei_cm.php [https://perma.cc/57L8-X57M].
11
See Abbott, supra note 8, at 1085 (discussing the lack of clarity and deception surrounding whether
or not AI systems are in fact inventing patented subject matter).
12
Id. (noting that AI systems have already conceived of patented ideas).
13
See generally In re Application No. 16/524,350, 2019 Dec. Comm’r Pat. at 6.
14
William W. Fisher III, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 169—170 (Stephen Munzer ed., 2001) (stating that the most
popular justification for intellectual property protections is utilitarian and the second most common is
labor).
15
Professor Ryan Abbott, University of Surrey, https://www.surrey.ac.uk/people/ryan-abbott
[https://perma.cc/PYZ9-ARBL].
16
See Abbott, supra note 8, at 1114.
17
See generally Abbott, supra note 8.
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source AI ideations become part of the public domain and are added as a
class of unpatentable subject matter.
I.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE CURRENT PATENT REGIME
A. Creativity Machines – A Unique Class of Artificial Intelligence

To begin, it is helpful to define the type of artificial intelligence system
at issue in this paper. Artificial intelligence is a broad field and the term itself
has become a buzzword so frequently used that it has lost meaning.18 It can
be generally said that “AI . . . refers to machines that are capable of
performing tasks that, if performed by a human, would be said to require
intelligence.”19 To perform these tasks, the vast majority of AI systems rely
on pattern recognition. These patterns are divined from the processing of
massive amounts of data, far more data than any person, or team of people,
could humanly process. Traditional AI systems then use those patterns to
achieve a narrow, explicit task.20
The aforementioned self-driving cars are an example of this traditional
method of AI. The self-driving systems are attempting to replicate a task that
humans already perform well – driving a car. The systems process huge
amounts of data, again, far more than any person is capable of. Uber has
reported that its self-driving cars have driven, and thus processed and learned
from, millions of miles of driving.21 Contrast that with the experience of an
average American driver. The U.S. Department of Transportation and
Federal Highway Administration reports that the average person drives
roughly 13,500 miles per year.22 As of 2019, the median age of an American
18
Ian Bogost, ‘Artificial Intelligence’ Has Become Meaningless, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/what-is-artificial-intelligence/518547/
[https://perma.cc/7D9J-8KWM] (“But in most cases, the systems making claims to artificial intelligence
aren’t sentient, self-aware, volitional, or even surprising. They’re just software.”).
19
Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies,
and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 362 (describing his definition of AI as “blissfully circular”).
20
Eban Escott, What Are the 3 Types of AI? A Guide to Narrow, General, and Super Artificial
Intelligence, CODEBOTS (Oct. 24, 2017), https://codebots.com/artificial-intelligence/the-3-types-of-ai-isthe-third-even-possible [https://perma.cc/64FR-G6EJ](“[Traditional] AI is goal-oriented, designed to
perform singular tasks – i.e. . . . driving a car. . . .”).
21
Kyle Wiggers, Uber’s 250 Autonomous Cars Have Driven ‘Millions’ of Miles and Transported
‘Tens of Thousands’ of Passengers, VENTUREBEAT: THE MACHINE (Apr. 11, 2019, 2:05 PM),
https://venturebeat.com/2019/04/11/ubers-250-autonomous-cars-have-driven-millions-of-miles-andtransported-tens-of-thousands-of-passengers/ [https://perma.cc/R3HU-2B7Z](“Uber revealed that it’s
collected data from ‘millions’ of autonomous vehicle testing miles to date. . . . “).
22
Hearst Autos Research, What Is Average Mileage Per Year?, CAR AND DRIVER,
https://www.caranddriver.com/research/a32880477/average-mileage-per-year/ [https://perma.cc/VF5ZA8BP] (“The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Highway Administration states the average
person drives around 13,500 miles every year.”).
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was 38.4 years.23 Assuming a minimum legal driving age of 16, the average
American has been driving for 22.4 years. The average American driver,
then, has driven about 300,000 miles in their life. The advantage that the
traditional AI approach has is quickly apparent. Uber’s self-driving system
is learning from millions of miles of driving while the average person behind
the wheel has only experienced approximately 300,000 miles. This is
representative of a typical AI system’s approach. The typical system
processes vast amounts of data, recognizes patterns from that data, and uses
those patterns to approximate a task that has been historically performed by
people.
This paper, however, is focused on a narrow subset of AI systems that
function differently and are built to perform a different sort of task entirely.
This subset of AI systems will be referred to as “creativity machines,” a
phrase coined in Dr. Stephen Thaler’s pioneering patent for exactly such a
machine.24 Creativity machines are built for the sole purpose of creating
unique ideas.25 They are not built to perform a narrow and specific task, like
drive a car. They are built to perform a broad and amorphous task: to
formulate new ideas.26 Creativity machines also function in a different way
than the typical AI system. These machines do not rely on processing huge
datasets and pattern recognition as most AI systems do.27
While the detailed machinations differ between systems, creativity
machines follow the same general functionality. First, the creativity machine
is exposed to a field of knowledge.28 Next, the machine is activated and
begins to generate ideas.29 Finally, the machine flags ideas that are new and
worthwhile.30 Creativity machines are not processing large amounts of data
23

Median Age of the Resident Population of the United States from 1960 to 2019, STATISTA (JAN.
20, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/241494/median-age-of-the-uspopulation/[https://perma.cc/
XQH6-783V] (showing that the median age of the U.S. population in 2019 was 38.4.).
24
See U.S. Patent No. 5,659,666 (filed Oct. 13, 1994) (describing the artificial intelligence system
that is being patented as a type of system “which we refer to as autonomous systems or ‘creativity
machines.’”).
25
See IEI’s Patented Creativity Machine Paradigm, supra note 10 (explaining that the creativity
machines are AI systems that generate new ideas.).
26
Id.
27
See id. (stating that creativity machines are simply trained upon a body of knowledge). But see
Wiggers, supra note 21 (explaining that Uber’s self-driving AI, a system representative of the way AI
typically learns and functions, processes millions of miles of driving to learn.).
28
See IEI’s Patented Creativity Machine Paradigm, supra note 10 (explaining that the creativity
machine is a “network that has been trained upon some body of knowledge.”).
29
See id. (explaining that, after being exposed to a body of knowledge, a creativity machine is “then
perturbed in a specially prescribed way [that] tends to activate into concepts and/or strategies (e.g., new
ideas) generalized from that conceptual space.”).
30
See id. (explaining that a creativity machine has a component that is “trained to filter out the most
salient of these notions . . . , accumulating useful concepts. . . .”).
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necessarily; they are simply taught a general field of knowledge. They are
not systems purposely built to perform a narrow task, they are simply taught
and set on their way to generate whatever ideas they may generate.
The most recent creativity machine of note is a creation of the
aforementioned Dr. Thaler. Thaler’s latest creativity machine is called
DABUS, which stands for “Device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping of
Unified Sentience.”31 DABUS is described as “a swarm of many
disconnected neural nets, each containing interrelated memories. . . .”32
DABUS invented two creations for which patent applications have been
filed. First, a container for food or beverages with a unique geometry that
would lend itself to tight packing for shipping or easier grasping by robotic
arms.33 Second, a light that flickers in a unique way so as to better grab
peoples’ attention,34 which could perhaps be implemented as a beacon on
search and rescue vehicles.
Patents were filed for the creations with the creativity machine,
DABUS, listed as the sole inventor.35 The USPTO rejected the applications
for one reason only. It stated that the listing of DABUS as the sole inventor
amounted to a failure to identify each inventor by their legal name.36 That
rejection, and the reasoning behind it, will be discussed in more detail in the
next section. Looked at another way, however, the rejection on the narrow
inventorship ground indicates that the inventions otherwise met all other
requirements of patentability.

31

David McCombs, AI Invents But Can’t Be an Inventor. So Now What?, LAW.COM: LEGALTECH
NEWS (Aug. 31, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/2020/08/31/ai-invents-but-cantbe-an-inventor-so-now-what/ [https://perma.cc/MT97-8TQT].
32
DABUS Described, IMAGINATION ENGINES INC., https://imagination-engines.com/dabus.html
[https://perma.cc/P3VH-EMA7].
33
In re Application No. 16/524,532, 2020 Dec. Comm’r Pat.; see also Leo Kelion, AI System
‘Should be Recognised as Inventor’, BBC NEWS (Aug. 1, 2019),https://www.bbc.com/news/technology
-49191645 [https://perma.cc/3Z5T-2NLU] (“The first patent describes a food container that uses fractal
designs to create pits and bulges in its sides. One benefit is that several containers can be fitted together
more tightly to help them be transported safely. Another is that it should be easier for robotic arms to pick
them up and grip them.”).
34
In re Application N. 16/524,350, 2019 Dec. Comm’r Pat.; see also Tyler Sonnemaker, No, an
Artificial Intelligence Can’t Legally Invent Something – Only ‘Natural Persons’ Can, Says US Patent
Office, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 29, 2020, 2:41 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/artificialinteligence-cant-legally-named-inventor-us-patent-office-ruling-2020-4 [https://perma.cc/H2DF-R8RU]
(“The second is a flickering light that mimics brain activity – or ‘neural flame,’ as Thaler dubbed it – that
could potentially be more effective at catching a person’s attention in an emergency situation.”).
35
See In re Application No, 16/524,532, 2020 Dec. Comm’r Pat.; In re Application No. 16/524,350,
2019 Dec. Comm’r Pat.
36
Rebecca Tapscott, USPTO Shoots Down DABUS’ Bid for Inventorship, IPWATCHDOG (May 4,
2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/05/04/uspto-shoots-dabus-bid-inventorship/[https://perma.cc/
8BEQ-YU6V].
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DABUS is positive proof that creativity machines are capable of
generating patentable inventions all on their own. Consequently, creativity
machines are requiring patent law to take stock of itself and interrogate the
inventorship requirement.
B. Patent Law’s Inventorship Requirement
Naturally, in order for there to be a patent, there must first be an
inventor.37 Creativity machines have shown they are capable of inventing
patentable ideas.38 Yet, the letter of the law indicates that AI systems cannot
be a named inventor on a patent.39 An unsteady legal fiction has resulted.
i. The Conception Requirement
The Federal Circuit has explained that “[m]aking [an] invention
requires conception and reduction to practice.”40 It has further explained, in
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., that in order to be a
named inventor on a patent, an inventor needs only to show conception, not
reduction to practice.41 In Burroughs, a group of scientists conceived of an
invention.42 A separate group of scientists then completed the reduction to
practice through a series of experiments.43 The group that conceived of the
original idea was deemed the inventors for the purposes of the patent.44 The
latter group that reduced the idea to practice were not considered inventors.45
Conception is the key requirement of inventorship, or, as the Burroughs
court went on to clearly state, “[c]onception is the touchstone of
inventorship. . . .”46 So, what is conception? Conception is “the formation in
the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete
and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice.”47 It is the
formation of the inventive idea as claimed in the patent.48 That inventive idea
37

35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (“An application for patent shall be made, or authorized to be made, by the
inventor. . . .”).
38
See Abbott, supra note 8, at 1085.
39
In re Application No. 16/524,350, 2019 Dec. Comm’r Pat. at 6 (“U.S. patent law does not permit
a machine to be named as the inventor in a patent application.”).
40
Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 742 F.3d 998, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
41
40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“But an inventor need not know that his invention will work
for conception to be complete. He need only show that he had the idea; the discovery that an invention
actually works is part of its reduction to practice.”).
42
Id. at 1226.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 1230.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 1227.
47
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (internal
quotations omitted).
48
Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1228.
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must be more than just a general plan or theory; it must be a definite and
permanent idea.49 The Federal Circuit explains that “[a]n idea is definite and
permanent when the inventor has a specific, settled idea, a particular solution
to the problem at hand, not just a general goal or research plan he hopes to
pursue.”50 The inventor does not need to know, however, that the invention
will work in order to meet the conception requirement.51 The inventor just
needs to be able to prove that he had the idea.52 The confirmation that the
idea is a success falls under the aforementioned reduction to practice
requirement.53
ii. Creativity Machines and Conception
Creativity machines are meeting the requirements to be an inventor,
particularly the salient conception requirement. The most difficult question
is whether or not creativity machines are in fact conceiving of these ideas.
Thaler has made this point clearly with his most recent patent applications,
listing his creativity machine DABUS, and only DABUS, as the inventor on
the patents.54
Creativity machines are simply exposed to a body of knowledge and go
on to generate ideas entirely on their own.55 The machines themselves
recognize and single out particularly salient ideas.56 These ideas are, as the
USPTO has confirmed by granting patents, complete and operative enough
to be granted patents.57 Human involvement, as is explored further, below, is
very minimal.

49

Id.
Id.
51
Id. at 1228. (“But an inventor need not know that his invention will work for conception to be
complete.”).
52
Scholars have pointed out that problem finding, the first identification that there is an underlying
problem in need of a solution, is undervalued and even ignored in patent law’s conception analysis. See
Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, The Social Origins of Innovation Failures, 70 S.M.U.L. REV. 377, 383 (2017)
(“[A] crucial step in idea generation—but one that is underappreciated in both patent law doctrine and
theory—is problem finding and problem framing.”). Even if problem finding were a required component
of conception, creativity machines would almost certainly still meet the conception requirement given
that the machines both identify and solve problems on their own.
53
Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1228 (“[T]he discovery that an invention actually works is part of its
reduction to practice.”).
54
See In re Application No. 16/524,532, 2020 Dec. Comm’r Pat.; In re Application No. 16/524,350,
2019 Dec. Comm’r Pat.
55
See IEI’s Patented Creativity Machine Paradigm, supra note 10.
56
See IEI’s Patented Creativity Machine Paradigm, supra note 10 (explaining that the creativity
machine recognizes the “novelty, utility, or value” of the different ideas it generates.).
57
Abbot, supra note 8 at 1079 (“Dr. Thaler is listed as the patent’s inventor, but he states that the
Creativity Machine invented the patent’s subject matter. . . .); see U.S. Patent No. 5,852,815 (issued Dec.
22, 1998).
50
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iii. USPTO Rules That AI Cannot be an Inventor
Can AI be a named inventor on a patent? The USPTO has
unambiguously let its position be known, ruling that it does not accept an AI
system as a named inventor on a patent.58 As stated earlier, Thaler submitted
two patent applications with his creativity machine, DABUS, listed as the
sole inventor on both.59 Based on the way DABUS functions, and Thaler’s
description of the process, it seems clear that DABUS, and DABUS alone,
was in fact the inventor behind the subject matter in the patent applications.60
And yet, the USPTO ruled that DABUS would not be allowed as the named
inventor on the patent applications.
The DABUS application was denied for want of a named inventor, with
the USPTO sending a Notice to File Missing Part of Nonprovisional
Application that stated the application “does not identify each inventor by
his or her legal name.”61 The crux of the Office’s position is that an inventor
must be a natural person, stating “U.S. patent law does not permit a machine
to be named as the inventor in a patent application.”62 This position was
based on a reading of the language in the statutory law, case law, and
regulatory law germane to inventorship.63
In coming to its conclusion, the USPTO looked to the U.S. code
underlying the Patent Act, Federal Circuit precedent, and the Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure.64 The USPTO asserts that the language used in
all of these references clearly requires an inventor to be a human.65 The code
underlying the Patent Act defines an inventor as “the individual or, if a joint
invention, the individuals collectively who invented or discovered the
subject matter of the invention.”66 Further language in the code, the USPTO
contended, unequivocally shows that an individual must be referring to a

58
See In re Application No. 16/524,350, 2019 Dec. Comm’r Pat. at 6 (“U.S. patent law does not
permit a machine to be named as the inventor in a patent application.”).
59
See In re Application No. 16/524,532, 2020 Dec. Comm’r Pat.; In re Application No. 16/524,350,
2019 Dec. Comm’r Pat.
60
See Pramod Chintalapoodi, USPTO Confirms AI Cannot Be Listed as Inventor in a Patent
Application, CHIP L. GRP. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.chiplawgroup.com/uspto-confirms-that-aicannot-be-listed-as-inventor-in-a-patent-application/ [https://perma.cc/497Q-GK7C](“[Thaler] further
asserted that DABUS was not created to solve any particular problem, and it was not trained on any
special data relevant to the instant invention. Instead, it was the machine, not a person, which recognized
the novelty and salience of the instant invention.”).
61
In re Application No. 16/524,350, 2019 Dec. Comm’r Pat. at 2.
62
Id. at 6; see id. at 4.
63
See generally id.
64
See id. at 4-6.
65
Id. at 4 (“[T]he patent laws require an inventor be a natural person.” (citing Univ. of Utah v. MaxPlanck-Gesellschaft Zur Forderung Der Wissenschaften e.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2013))).
66
35 U.S.C. § 100(f).
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natural person.67 35 U.S.C. § 101, for example, used the word “whoever”
when referring to an inventor, clearly suggesting that an inventor must be a
natural person.68 The code goes on to refer to the “individuals” that are
inventors by using the pronouns “himself” and “herself,” again connotating
personhood.69
The Office bolstered its interpretation by showing that the Federal
Circuit has come to the same conclusion.70 In University of Utah v. MaxPlanck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften e.V., the court stated
that conception, the mental act requirement of invention, could only be
performed by a natural person.71 The Federal Circuit has also stated, in Beech
Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., that “only natural persons can be ‘inventors.’”72
Finally, the USPTO highlighted that the language used in the Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) also implies an inventor must be a
natural person.73
iv.

The USPTO Correctly Interpreted the Law but Established a
Legal Fiction
The USPTO seems to have correctly interpreted the law as currently
written to require that an inventor must be a natural person. The code
underlying the Patent Act, referring to an inventor with “whoever,”
“himself,” and “herself,” is particularly persuasive.74 The Federal Circuit
having come to the same conclusion and throwing its considerable weight
behind the interpretation only reinforces the reading.75 The USPTO and
Federal Circuit agree and the reading of the law seems inarguable; an
inventor must be a natural person and therefore an AI system cannot be a
name inventor on a patent.

67

See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 100, 101.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.” (emphasis added)).
69
35 U.S.C. § 115(b)(2) (“[S]uch individual believes himself or herself to be the original inventor or
an original joint inventor of a claimed invention in the application.”).
70
In re Application No. 16/524,350, 2019 Dec. Comm’r Pat. at 4 (“In addition, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) has explained that the patent laws require that an inventor
be a natural person.”).
71
734 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“To perform this mental act, inventors must be natural
persons and cannot be corporations or sovereigns.”).
72
990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Application No. 16/524,350, 2019 Dec. Comm’r Pat.
at 5.
73
See In re Application No. 16/524,350, 2019 Dec. Comm’r Pat. at 6 (“[MPEP] follows the patent
statutes and the Federal Circuit case law concerning inventorship. . . .”).
74
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 115(b)(2).
75
See In re Application No. 16/524,350, 2019 Dec. Comm’r Pat. at 4.
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And yet, in interpreting the law as disallowing AI inventors, the USPTO
and Federal Circuit have also created a troublesome legal fiction.76 As has
been established, these creativity machines are capable of conceiving
patentable inventions.77 DABUS was listed as the sole inventor on two patent
applications because DABUS, on its own, conceived of the ideas underlying
the patent claims.78 That DABUS, the inventor, is not allowed as the named
inventor on the patent is a legal construction.79 This fiction especially flies in
the face of inventorship. While the ownership of a patent can be contractually
delegated, the inventorship of a patent cannot.80 “[A] person not entitled to
be named an inventor cannot bargain to become one.”81 Patent law will now
not only allow that possibility but require it for AI conceived inventions. AI
invented subject matter will only be granted a patent if a person, who is not
the inventor, puts their name down as inventor instead.
II.

WHO SHOULD BE THE INVENTOR OF AN AI CREATED IDEA?

The USPTO seems to have correctly interpreted the law as written by
not permitting an AI system as a named patent inventor. The ruling also
ignores the reality of the situation and creates an untenable legal fiction. As
analyzed below, there is no logically coherent or compelling policy solution
available other than to allow AI to be a named inventor.
A. Justifications for Patent Law
There are two common justifications for America’s current patent law
regime – utilitarian theory and labor theory. The most dominant theory in
legal discourse is the utilitarian or incentive justification.82 The idea is that
by maximizing innovation and the number of inventions produced, a society
in turn maximizes utility and social welfare.83 The theory is that a legal
protection for inventive ideas will encourage and incentivize people to
innovate.84 Without that protection, the worry is that people will not innovate
for fear that others, known as free riders, will swoop in and steal the idea as
76
See Legal Fiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“An assumption that something is
true even though it may be untrue. . . .”).
77
See Abbott, supra note 8, at 1085.
78
See Chintalapoodi, supra note 60.
79
See Legal Fiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
80
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY 1010 (7th ed.
2017).
81
Id.
82
Gordon Hull, Intellectual Property, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 1-3 (Hugh
LaFollette ed., 2019) (“The most common justification for IP is broadly utilitarian. . . .”).
83
Id. at 3 (“[H]aving more goods such as inventions and art in a society increases overall utility.”).
84
See id.
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soon as it is complete.85 Thus, the innovator would put the time and money
into inventing something but the free rider, having spent nothing, would
come in and reap the benefits, taking them away from the innovator.86
Without a protection against that loss to free riders, rational people may opt
to not innovate at all.87 Patent law provides that legal protection to innovators
in an effort to incentivize, and hopefully maximize, innovation.88 By
maximizing innovation, the hope is that societal wellbeing will be
maximized as well.89
The labor theory for patent law is as it sounds, that legal protection is
the rightful reward to the inventor for their labor.90 This justification follows
the logic of John Locke, that “when one labors on something, one . . . makes
it one’s own.”91 These two theories of justification, utilitarian and labor,
dominate patent law analysis.92 They shape the view that patent law exists
for two primary reasons, to incentivize innovation and to reward a person
that labored to bring the innovation about.
B. If Not AI, Then Who?
If the USPTO’s legal fiction is to be followed, and AI is not allowed as
a named inventor even when it conceives of the idea claimed in a patent, then
which party should be the inventor? There are three viable candidates: the
user or operator of the AI system, the creator of the AI system, or nobody.
All of these candidates, when considered against the primary theories of
patent law justification, have arguably disqualifying flaws.
First, the user or operator of the AI system is considered as a candidate
for inventor of an AI-conceived idea. For the purposes of this paper, the user
is referring to the person exposing a creativity machine to an area of
knowledge and receiving the resultant idea.93 It is oftentimes the case that the
creator and user of a creativity machine is the same person. As creativity
85
Id. (“[A] rational agent will not produce such goods without some sort of compensating incentive
structure.”).
86
See id. (“[I]t is very difficult to prevent other from free riding on the good, since intangible goods
are usually (and increasingly) cheap to copy, and since no one will pay more for something she can get
for less. . . .”).
87
See id.
88
See id.
89
See id.
90
See id. at 6 (“This claim right is something that the individual has earned as the just dessert of her
labor.”).
91
Id.
92
See Fisher, supra note 14, at 169-70 (stating that the most popular justification for intellectual
property protections is utilitarian and the second most common is labor).
93
See generally IEI’s Patented Creativity Machine Paradigm, supra note 10(explaining that the
creativity machine is a “network that has been trained upon some body of knowledge. . . .”).
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machines inevitably become more widespread, it is a surety that more and
more people outside of the creators will be the users of the machines. For
that reason, this analysis considers each candidate on its own. For example,
when analyzing the AI user as a candidate for inventor, it will be assumed
that the person is a user only and not also the creator.
Ideally, patent law’s incentive power would be harnessed to incentivize
the development of better creativity machines. In other words, the people
creating and developing creativity machines should be the ones targeted by
the incentive power of patent law. The user, having had no role in the
creation of the AI, is therefore a poor fit with incentive theory. The user
seems closer to a free rider, swooping in to extract the benefit from an
innovation he did not necessarily contribute to.94 The user is the person
contributing the most proximate labor to the generated idea.95 However, the
amount of labor that the user provides, simply exposing the creativity
machine to knowledge and possibly inputting basic solution requirements,
does not seem very significant. The proximate, but small, amount of work
contributed means that the user is also a poor fit with labor theory. In
summation, the user is the human most closely involved with the creativity
machine when it conceives of an idea. However, the user’s justification for
being an inventor under both incentive and labor theories is so weak, it does
not seem useful or proper to allow the user to be considered the inventor of
an AI-created work.
Next, the creator of the AI system is considered. In many ways, the
creator represents the opposite side of the coin from the user in the
justification analysis. If patent law seeks to incentivize the creation and
improvement of creativity machines, the AI creators are the people to
incentivize. If AI creators were considered the inventors of all works
conceived by their AI systems, a very strong incentive would exist for AI
creators to continue to improve existing systems and build new systems.
After all, the creators would be able to reap the reward of all inventions
generated by their machines. It could also be argued that the AI creator is the
most deserving of the patent reward according to labor theory. The creator
is, after all, expending considerable time and effort in creating the creativity
machine in the first place. This labor, however, is quite removed from the
creativity machine’s idea conception. The creator’s labor is not nearly as
proximate to the creativity machine’s ideation as the user’s labor is.

94

See generally Hull, supra note 82, at 3 (describing free riders as those who don’t contribute to an
innovation but seek to benefit from it).
95
See Proximate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining proximate as “[i]mmediately
before or after” or “[v]ery near or close in time or space”).
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If the AI creator were assigned as inventor, a disastrous fairness and
practicality issue would likely arise. Awarding inventorship of any and all
ideas to the creator of the AI system would have massively far-reaching
consequences. If a patented AI system, like Thaler’s original creativity
machine, were broadly used, it would mean a single person (or party,
depending on how generously Thaler construes the definition of creator)
would be the inventor of all AI created ideas. That would be a nearly
limitless, wide ranging, and powerful grant of IP protection. This would also
introduce complex line drawing disputes for creators of AI systems. The
question of who is legally considered a creator would become incredibly
important and lead to increased cost and litigation upon the legal system. For
these reasons of fairness and practicality, the creator of the AI does not seem
to be the proper candidate to award inventorship to.
Finally, if neither the AI user nor creator are fit candidates for
inventorship, perhaps no person should be awarded inventorship and AI
generated ideas should not be patentable. This is an unsatisfying solution
because it is completely abandoning the use of patent law as an incentive
tool.96 It is clear that AI generally and creativity machines specifically will
play in integral part in the way we innovate and invent going forward.97 To
not fully leverage patent law to incentivize the development of creativity
machines would be a missed, or more accurately abandoned, opportunity.
This solution would also encourage AI users to act dishonestly and claim AI
conceived ideas as their own, as Thaler himself has already admitted to
doing.98
The USPTO’s legal fiction, not allowing an AI system to be a named
inventor even when it is conceiving of the patented claim, does not seem to
have a compelling solution. There does not seem to be a fitting human
candidate for inventorship of an AI-created idea. The AI user is not situated
to create and improve creativity machines, and thus the incentive power of
patent law is lost on him. Additionally, the user’s labor, while proximate to
the creativity machine’s idea creation, is minimal. The AI creator is the ideal
party for patent law to incentivize further AI development and also puts
considerable labor into the creativity machine. The practical effect of

96

See generally Hull, supra note 82, at 3 (discussing patent law being used as an incentive).
See generally Dirk Knemeyer & Jonathan Follett, Could Machines Become Creative?, TOWARDS
DATA SCI. (June 13, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/could-machines-become-creative49f346dcd3a3 [https://perma.cc/Y5YT-ANL4]
(“AI automation is coming, and it’s going to impact knowledge workers–writers, artists, designers,
scientists, managers, and entrepreneurs”).
98
Abbott, supra note 8, at 1085 (stating that Thaler has listed himself as the inventor on patents
where the underlying creation was actually invented by his creativity machine).
97
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assigning inventorship to the creator, however, is too wide-ranging to be
allowed.
Finally, not allowing any person to be an inventor, thus rendering AIconceived ideas unpatentable, is also undesirable as it is an abandonment of
patent law as an incentive tool for AI development.
C. AI Should Be Allowed as an Inventor
i. A Proposed Solution
The legal fiction concerning AI and inventorship seems untenable. A
possible solution is to acknowledge that AI is capable of invention and allow
AI as a named inventor when patent ownership has been pre-contracted away
to a natural person. The pre-contracting of patent ownership is already the
status quo for the vast majority of patents; as of 2013, “about ninety-three
percent of patents were assigned to organizations rather than individuals.”99
When a creativity machine is used to generate an idea, and the owner of the
resultant patentable idea has been decided ahead of time by a contract, the
AI would be allowed as inventor and the patent ownership would be
immediately transferred to the contractually identified person.
This solution would utilize patent law to incentivize creativity machine
development without the pernicious scope that an AI creator being assigned
inventor could allow. It would allow creativity machine creators to easily
license their machines to users. Users could be confident in the decision to
license a creativity machine knowing that they could legally assign all
resultant AI patents to themselves via contract. User confidence in licensing
would in turn increase the economic value of creativity machines, giving AI
creators another means of monetizing their work and a compelling incentive
to continue creativity machine development. It is true that under the current
regime, patents could be assigned to users, but the entire system is reliant
upon users claiming they are inventors when they really are not. A user could
not be confident in licensing a creativity machine under this climate, relying
on the law to continue to look the other way as users take matters into their
own hands.
ii. An Imminent Problem
A growing problem remains unaddressed. The proposed solution, while
a logically coherent adjustment of patent law, is relying largely on contract
law to solve the issue. What is to be done in situations where the owner of
an AI-generated patent is not contractually decided ahead of time? This is a
likely possibility, as AI systems are increasingly made publicly available as

99

Abbott, supra note 8, at 1092 n.101.
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open-source systems.100 There have already been disagreements over who
owns an open-source AI system’s creation with significant money at stake.101
In 2018, an art collective known as Obvious used an AI system to create a
painting and proceeded to sell said painting at venerated British auction
house Christie’s for $432,500.102 There was just one problem – Obvious used
an open-source AI and the creator of that AI was not happy about it.103 The
AI creator, Robbie Barrat, did not like that Obvious used his system to
generate a work and sell it for a profit.104 The issue was ultimately left alone,
as Barrat indicated he would not seek a share of the profits and Obvious did
not comment on whether it would voluntarily share any.105
A possible solution would be for AI-generated ideas, when the owner
of any resultant patent has not been contractually decided ahead of time, to
enter the public domain and be unpatentable. This could function as an
expansion of the unpatentable subject matter doctrine.106 In addition to “the
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas,” a category such as
ideas generated by a non-human where ownership has not been precontracted could be added.107 This would maintain a logical approach and
acknowledgement of AI’s ability. AI is capable of generating patentable
ideas and it does no good to pretend otherwise. At the same time, it should
not considerably weaken patent law’s incentive for creators to improve and
innovate creativity machines. As stated earlier, as of 2013, over ninety
percent of patents were owned by corporations, not individuals.108 Thus,
instances where AI is generating patentable ideas outside of pre-contracted
terms would likely be the vast minority of AI ideation. Further, for that
minority of instances, AI creators who opt to make their AI open source are
likely to motivated by something other than money.109
100

Cynthia Harvey, Open Source Artificial Intelligence: Leading Projects, DATAMATION (Mar. 25,
2021), https://www.datamation.com/artificial-intelligence/open-source-artificial-intelligence-projects.
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CONCLUSION
The law has refused to acknowledge AI’s ever-advancing
capabilities. This was made clear by the USPTO’s ruling that AI systems
may not be named inventors on a patent. The result is a troubling legal
fiction where, despite AI systems being capable of invention, the law will
not allow them to be acknowledged as such.
Rather than relying on that legal fiction, this note suggests a twopart solution centered on the pre-contracting of patent ownership when an
AI system is the inventor. First, when patent ownership has been precontracted away to a natural person, AI systems should be allowed as
named inventors on patents. Second, when patent ownership has not been
pre-contracted away to a natural person, any resultant discoveries made by
an AI system should be deemed unpatentable. This could be accomplished
by expanding the unpatentable subject matter doctrine to include “ideas
generated by a non-human where ownership has not been pre-contracted.”
Such a solution would acknowledge the reality that AI systems are capable
of invention while also best utilizing the incentive power of patent law. The
clarity of this solution, that patents could be granted to AI systems as long
as ownership was contracted ahead of time, would incentivize AI creators
and users alike to continue the development of AI systems.

CGZZ] (explaining that for open source coders, “the motivation behind [open source work] is of an
intrinsic nature – driven by interest, fun, altruism and a desire to learn”).
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